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ABSTRACT
The Hotelling Valuation Principal (HVP) implies that the value per unit of an inground exhaustible natural resource is equal to the current price less the cost of production.
The assumptions required for this principle include a certain and homogenous reserve
stock, unconstrained extraction, and constant costs. Extensive research has empirically
investigated the HVP. This paper expands the HVP framework and relaxes the theory’s
assumptions to account for reserve differentials. The results show that the original net
price model is more closely aligned with developed reserve value, than total reserve value.
In addition, this paper develops two- and three-factor net price models to incorporate user
cost, extraction capacity and the risk of developing and producing oil and gas reserves.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Hotelling theory posits that in a competitive market, the net price per unit of an
exhaustible natural resource (prevailing spot commodity price less its per unit marginal
production cost) increases at the fair rate of return (Hotelling, 1931). Miller and Upton
(1985a) build upon the Hotelling theory and convert the dynamic optimization problem
into a static process. They theorize that the value per unit of an in-ground exhaustible
natural resource is the current net price when the fair rate of return is equal to the interest
rate or rate of discount. This “implication” is referred to as the Hotelling Valuation
Principle (HVP) and offers an alternative testing method for Hotelling theory.
However, prior literature shows that the net price construct does not follow
observed price trends. Similarly, the empirical framework based on HVP generally
overstates in-ground reserve value. Moreover, other unrealistic assumptions such as a
certain and homogeneous reserve stock and unconstrained extraction have inhibited
HVP’s empirical validity. This over estimation is attributable to HVP’s simplified cost
structure, which does not adequately account for the user costs and production constraints
associated with extraction. This paper argues that the inclusion of user cost into HVP’s
net price construct will assist in unveiling a producing asset’s true resource rent.
Santopietro (1998) contends that when a natural resource is privately owned, the resource
rent is part of the net worth of the owner.
1

This paper revisits the Hotelling Valuation Principle and develops a framework
that adjusts net price for developed versus undeveloped reserve differentials. In addition,
a two-factor developed reserve model is constructed using a reserve extraction rate and a
risk adjustment factor that further delineates net price. For total reserve values that contain
both developed and undeveloped resources, a three-factor model is built that incorporates
user cost and accounts for depletion.
This research compiles a sample of 61 oil and gas companies based on Ernst &
Young’s annual industry survey of the largest U.S. producing firms. The company-level
production, cost and reserve data are pulled from FactSet, Inc. and company annual
reports. The sample period compares reserve values and net prices from 2015 to 2020,
which includes a full boom and bust commodity price cycle. This paper finds that HVP’s
net price is more closely associated with developed reserves than undeveloped nonproducing reserves. In addition, the two- and three-factor models show significant net
price coefficients that approximate unity, which has been difficult to achieve empirically.
This research contributes to the literature in three main ways. First, the paper
extends the HVP literature to account for reserve differentials that were not explored
previously in the literature. The HVP net price framework applies to total reserves, which
includes both developed and undeveloped non-producing acreage. However, it only
factors in production costs, not user costs. Development costs are relevant to a firm’s
proved undeveloped (PUD) reserves, which require additional capital to begin extraction.
PUD reserves can make up a considerable portion of total reserves, particularly in this era
of rapid shale oil drilling. For example, on average, 40% of proven reserves are classified
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as undeveloped among the 61 firms surveyed for this paper. This paper finds that the HVP
net price is more closely associated with developed reserves rather than total reserves.
Second, this paper introduces a user cost factor to Hotelling’s net price framework
to provide a more complete assessment of a reserve’s full cost structure. This in turn, will
offer an estimate of a resource owner’s rent, which is also a measure of scarcity according
to Devarajan and Fisher (1982). A resource owner’s rent can be thought of as the
opportunity cost of reinvesting profits from produced reserves, so that future generations
may also benefit from the utility of the natural resource. Prior literature measures the
resource rent as discovery costs, which are the total exploration and development costs
necessary to bring an additional unit of nonrenewable resource to market (Adelman, 1990
Devarajan, Fisher, 1982; Lasserre, 1985). However, such measurement is problematic
and difficult to observe in most cases (Lasserre, 1985). As Adelman et al (1991) outlines,
resource rent is user cost or the difference between the in-ground market value and the
present value of expected increases in development cost, where the present value of
development cost can be approximated by the current development cost.
Third, this research develops the two- and three-factor net price models to correct
for unrestricted or instantaneous extraction implied by HVP (Adelman, 1990). This
modification draws from prior literature (Adelman, 1990; Davis & Cairns, 1999;
Thompson, 2001) that accounts for annual extraction capacity and gradual exploitation of
the reserve base. The modified net price models also adjust for uncertainty or the risk of
developing and producing oil and gas reserves. This modified net price is shown to
improve the explanatory power and empirical validity of HVP.

3

The structure of this dissertation is as follows. Section 2 provides an outline of the
conceptual background of Hotelling theory and its development. Section 3 develops the
hypothesis. Section 4 outlines this study’s data and methodology. Section 5 presents the
empirical results. In Section 6, conclusions are drawn and opportunities for future
research are discussed.
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2. LITERATUER REVIEW
Since Harold Hotelling published his influential work in 1931, The Economics of
Exhaustible Resources, which become the theoretical bedrock for natural resource
economics. Hotelling’s theory was motivated as a response to calls for regulation as
reformists and conservationists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century felt
natural resources were too important and scarce to be left to monopolists and opportunists
(Gaudet, 2007). However, Hotelling believed “competitive markets could achieve the
planners solution” (Slade & Thille, 2009). This led to his model of sustainable resource
extraction, where he established a framework of depreciation as an asset, discounted at
the value of its future return (Gaudet, 2007). This model was derived in part from his prior
work involving depreciation, in a 1925 publication (Hotelling, 1925).
Hotelling’s theory argues that the net price of a nonrenewable resource should rise
at the rate of interest. Net price is equal to the price of the commodity net of marginal
production cost (Livernois & Martin, 2001). This would optimize the behavior of resource
owners to supply their commodity when the resource rent or net price is extracted at a rate
equivalent to the market rate of interest. This construct is known as Hotelling’s r-percent
growth rule (Solow, 1974), which has been at the heart of empirical studies of the theory
over the last fifty years.
The base model is as follows:
5

Net Pricet = Net Price0ert

(1)

Where,
Net Pricet = Price - Per unit marginal production cost at time t.
Net Priceo = Net price at time 0.
r = The prevailing market rate of interest
Conceptually, this framework is straight forward and would seem applicable to
observed price behavior.

However, for most empirical tests, the linkage between

commodity price paths and the market rate of interest has had difficulty adhering to the rpercent rule. Prior literature has explored several reasons for this lack of adherence,
mostly surrounding a few restrictive assumptions involving: perfect competition, a certain
resource stock, and issues around durability (Adelman et al.,1991(Levhari & Pindyck,
1981); Pindyck,1978; Salant,1976). Further, Hotelling’s theory “fails to capture the
tendency of production costs to rise as a resource is extracted”, known a resource
degradation (Livernois & Martin, 2001). Similarly, real-world constraints to production
have been mentioned as inhibitors to the theory’s observed success, which has led to
several extensions to Hotelling’s general model, (Adelman et al, 1991; Anderson,
Kellogg, & Salant, 2018; Davis & Cairns, 1999; and McDonald 1994).
Nevertheless, despite these real-world discrepancies, Hotelling’s resource theory
remains foundational and is still relevant within the literature. Moreover, from an asset
pricing standpoint, Livernois (2009) maintains that the Hotelling Valuation Principle
offers a practical method for valuing a stock of nonrenewable reserves. This methodology
has been suitably applied at a national level, as seen in Green National Income
Accounting, or with investors wanting to determine the value of a firm’s in-ground assets.
6

Davis and Cairns (1998) argue that net price is a “sufficient statistic” and gives a good
approximation of value, which is particularly useful at cutting through private sector
informational asymmetry found in valuation work.
2.1 COMMODITY PRICE PATHS
Initial streams of research examined the price trend of commodities (exhaustible
nonrenewable resources) over very long cycles to determine whether these price trends
followed the rate of interest or perhaps even signaled scarcity. What these researchers
generally found was that real prices had fallen over time and were highly volatile.
Barnett and Morse (1963) were the first to formally analyze commodity price
history in a study commissioned by the “Resources for the Future” commission, which is
an independent organization conducting research regarding environmental, energy and
natural resources issues. The study included long run commodity price data from 1870 to
1957. They concluded that resource scarcity was not a problem given historical trends
that showed a decline in real prices, which is counter to the Hotelling theory. More
recently, Hart and Spiro (2011) also argue that the notion of scarcity rents making up a
large share of oil prices is false and have not been prevalent historically.
Smith (1979), followed the Barnett and Morse paper using more sophisticated
statistical techniques, with a data set from 1900 to 1973 covering a broad array of
nonrenewable commodities.

Smith (1979) found no discernable trend in commodity

prices in either direction. Slade (1982) also tested long-run commodity price trends from
1870 to 1978 that showed evidence of a U-shaped pricing path; with prices declining until
the 1960’s and later increasing in the 70’s for 11 of the 12 commodities tested. The study
7

noted that technological innovation eventually offset rising costs related to resource
degradation.
Heal and Barrow (1980) attempted to correlate base metal (Copper, Lead, Zinc, &
Tin) price movements from July 1965 to June 1977 with the 91-Day UK Treasury Bill,
but were unable to substantiate the Hotelling percent-r model. Interestingly, however,
they concluded that the rate of change in interest rates was more important than the level,
relative to commodity price determination.
Chari and Christiano (2014) examined the historical time series of a variety of
exhaustible commodities ranging from aluminum, coal, oil and lead going back as far as
the 1600’s in some cases, which showed commodity prices varied greatly and cannot be
explained by the path of interest rates as the Hoteling theory suggest. They deemed this
inconsistency the “Hotelling Puzzle” and illustrated how commodity prices from the 19th
century have increased at a rate far below the average inflation adjusted U.S. Treasury
yield of 1.14 percent during the twentieth century.
Neumann and Erlei (2014) highlight that prices of resources (i.e. coal, oil and
natural gas) have not followed an upward exponential trend in prices. In fact, they showed
periods of extreme short-run volatility in both the up and down trends. However, in an
interesting theoretical exercise, Neumann and Erlei (2014) conducted an experiment using
a simulation study of 10 buyers and sellers, that showed how auction prices for resources
displayed an increasing price path, and trading volume in conjunction with depleting
stocks, also behaved in accordance to the theory.
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Constructively, Gaudet (2007) believes that the Hotelling theory still maintains its
relevance due to constraints that cause net price to rise more slowly than the market rate.
These constraints when viewed in the context of market equilibrium and imply that there
must be more to the return of holding non-renewable stocks than simply the rate of price
appreciation. Specifically, Gaudet (2007) once again summarizes real-world complexities
such as, declining long-run production costs (due to technological innovation), resource
durability (storage and recycling), market structure (monopoly, oligopoly) and resource
and commodity price uncertainty, which must also be considered to correctly reconcile
the rate of return on resource stocks.
Notably, Ferrria da Cunha and Missemer (2020) reviewed extensive unpublished
archives of Hotelling’s work and determined that the lack of empirical support for
Hotelling’s percent-r rule was caused by the notion that it was in fact a rule. Rather they
assert Hotelling thought it should be viewed as a “hypothetical stylized asset” that is finite
in nature.

However, Hotelling did discuss and was aware of real-world geologic

constraints to producing a mineral resource, such as cost inflation due to higher cumulative
production, output variations and uncertainty over resource size. They argue these real
contingencies provide an opportunity for alternative models that incorporate bell and Ushaped price equilibriums.
2.2 HOTELLING VALUATION PRINCIPLE (HVP)
Miller and Upton (1985a) originally proposed an alternative testing strategy that
changes the unit of analysis from commodity price paths that adhere to the r-percent rule
to in-ground reserve values. This implication of Hotelling theory, captures the market
9

value of a stock of resources that is equal to the present value of the resource’s future
profits (Santopietro, 1998). This stock valuation method is based on the idea that resource
rent is part of the net worth of private owners. Therefore, the total value of a producing
firms per unit assets (net price) will equal the value of its liabilities in the form of debt and
equity, or per unit enterprise value. As Santopietro (1998) mentions, the benefit of this
methodology versus conventional valuation models is the low demand for information and
explicit assumptions. However, market prices per unit of reserves can vary greatly
because of asset quality, idiosyncratic cost differences or be clouded by other nonproducing asset values that would distort per unit values.
Miller & Upton (1985a) compared in-ground valuations for publicly traded oil and
gas, exploration and production (E&P) companies between 1979 and 1981.

After

tabulating the market value of debt and equity and netting out non-producing assets for
the 39 firms in their sample, Miller and Upton (1985a) produced successful results with a
net price coefficient near one and an r-squared statistic that explained forty percent of the
variation of in-ground values. However, the data set for this analysis was within the highly
charged Iranian Hostage crisis timeframe, and at the peak of a decade long battle with
inflation, which translated into unsustainably high oil prices and correspondingly high
reserve values.
Therefore, to further establish the durability of HVP, Miller and Upton (1985b)
conducted a parallel study during the Reagan era of oil price moderation from August,
1981 to December, 1983. Unfortunately, this version did not prove fruitful and was
deemed “noninformative” due to low price volatility. However, oil and gas royalty trusts
which comprised a small 12 firm subset of their data did show promising results, which is
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interesting given their simple business model, which is based purely on resource
exploitation and is not complicated by other assets or undeveloped acreage that can
obscure reserve valuation. Moreover, Crain and Jamal (1991), (1998) also experienced
empirical legitimacy applying HVP to publicly traded royalty trusts and Master Limited
Partnerships (MLPs), albeit with some degree of data transformation and smaller samples.
There have been a handful of important empirical tests using the Hotelling Valuation
Principle (HVP) to value in-ground oil and gas assets. Magliolo (1986) analyzes market
values of producing firms’ reserves relative to newly established reserve recognition
accounting (RRA) rules at the time, which is similar to today’s annual SEC reporting
requirements and generally found that RRA data did not adequately explain market values
of producing firms.
Adelman et al. (1991) analyzed user cost or depletion as a measure of resource rent.
The authors argue that current development cost can be utilized as a measure to
approximate user cost. After studying third party oil and gas transactions from 1979 to
1988 and third-party reserve values for firms between 1946 to 1987, Adelman et al (1991)
established that in-ground oil and gas reserves generally trade a one-half of net price and
one-third of the wellhead price.
Watkins (1992) applied HVP to 27 private oil and gas corporate and property
transactions in Alberta, Canada, between 1989 and 1991, but the results showed no
support for HVP. Later, Adelman & Watkins (1995), analyze 34 private transactions over
the same 1989-91 period, and results were also decidedly against HVP. However, using
a disaggregated oil and gas model and incorporating measures for production rates and a
15% discount rate, results were more constructive. Moreover, Adelman and Watkin’s
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(1995) modified transaction model were compared with observed per unit prices, which
showed promise at implying future expectations for oil and gas commodity prices.
Davis and Cairns (1998) also showed how HVP continually overvalues in-ground
oil reserves due to simplifying assumptions of the theory that ignore well specific
production constraints.

They compensate for these production constraints with a

modification that sets net price at one half its calculated value. This method was applied
to Watkins (1992) and Adelman and Watkins (1995) data, which produced better fits but
yielded slope coefficients that remained significantly below one. Davis and Cairns (1999)
also demonstrated how HVP provides and upper bound to reserve valuation based on
previous applications of HVP in prior studies (Crain & Jamal, 1998; Magliolo, 1986;
Miller & Upton, 1985a,b; Johnsen, Paxson, & Rizzuto, 1996) where most of the
observations were below the HVP valuation estimate.
The valuation principle has similarly been tested in other resource categories;
such as, hard-rock mining (Cairns & Davis, 1998) where the authors reformulated the
basic Miller & Upton (1985a) model that returned valuation measures 40% below the
original net price estimates. Further, when the base model is adjusted for remaining mine
life (a mine capacity constraint), the explanatory power of their HVP model improved
when compared to gold mining transactions (Cairns & Davis, 1998; Cairns & Davis,
2005).
Livernois, Thille and Zhang (2006) analyzed timber resources based on stumpage
price bids made by logging firms. The authors believed stumpage prices were a more
accurate measure of rent versus mineral data given that there were no new discoveries or
revisions to the physical stock, and less uncertainty about the quality of the resource. The
12

authors derive different discounts rates to approximate Hotelling’s r-percent rule,
including the CAPM model. In either case, their analysis produced significant results, but
explanatory power was generally lower due to high price volatility.
Overall, regarding empirical tests of HVP in-ground valuation, results have had little
success using Hotelling’s base net price model. The Hotelling Valuation Principle has
typically overestimated in-ground resource value and only been successful under very
specific conditions when net price is adjusted for everyday contingencies.
2.3 EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT & PRODUCTION
One empirical limitation that has plagued the success of Hotelling theory is the
assumption of a fixed resource stock or supply. Particularly, given that all-natural
resources can be renewed through additional capital investment that are motivated in
response to rising commodity prices. Adelman (1991) argues that the notion of a fixed
mineral stock is “superfluous and wrong”, the appropriate categorization should be framed
as an inventory of proved reserves that are replaced through development.
Hotelling theory also touches on how uncertainty over resource size causes
changes in the rate of extraction. If owners are uncertain about the exact size of their
deposit, they will extract the commodity at a more conservative rate of production
(Devarajan & Fisher, 1981). Hotelling (1931) also discusses that when a fixed resource
begins to deplete, production costs will increase. Notably, however, this concept of
resource degradation is not formally addressed in Hotelling’s model, as costs are assumed
to be constant under the theory. However, Atewamba and Nkuiya (2015) find empirical
evidence that extraction costs are stock dependent after analyzing fourteen non-renewable
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natural resources. The researchers used a reformulated Hotelling model that incorporates
technology gains and stock dependent production costs. Interestingly, they also found
that the extraction rate tends to be higher in an environment of declining resource prices
than a rising price environment (Atewamba & Nkuiya, 2015).
Pindyck (1978) looks beyond Hotelling’s fixed supply assumption and points out
the role of exploration relative to production costs. He shows that additional resource
accumulation lowers production costs, thus allowing a producer to maximize the present
value of reserves by extracting higher quality (lower cost) resources earlier in the process.
This research also brings to light the delicate balance between extraction (harvesting
profits) and exploration (reinvesting profits) that a resource owner must regulate
optimally to replace reserves and maintain a competitive cost structure.

Avoiding

resource degradation motivates a firm to engage in exploration, which influences a
resource owner’s market power, particularly among price taking firms.
As a result of owners engaging in exploration and development, Pindyck (1978)
also finds evidence of a U-shape price path of commodity price movements. Typically,
commodity prices fall initially in response to successful exploration to a stabilization point
and then begin to increase over time, as scarcity of the commodity grows due to depletion
or outsized demand growth. Further, Slade (1982) also finds evidence of a U-shape
pricing path as production costs decline in response to technological improvements, which
is similar to what was experienced in response to shale oil and natural gas fracking.
In terms of expected price and production decisions, Thompson (2001) argues that
the optimal answer has become a corner solution among practitioners whose strong
14

preference is to produce at capacity, regardless of price, as marginal operating costs have
historically trended well below petroleum prices. This idea is empirically tested using 53
public oil and gas producer observations over a window from Sept 1991 through June
1992. A reserve model utilizing each firm’s production-to-reserves ratio as a proxy for
maximum capacity showed better results than the Miller & Upton (1985a,b) method. In
addition, Thompson used private transaction data from 1980 to 1998 to highlight how
firms with longer reserve lives (lower production capacities) are generally less valuable.
All of which, demonstrates that production at capacity accounts for a meaningful portion
of reserve value in both the public and private markets.
Anderson et al.,

(2018) brought forth the notion that Hotelling’s net price

framework should not be viewed strictly as a production function. Instead, it should be
reformulated as a drilling problem that replaces or increases reserves. This is due to their
observation that current production is generally inelastic to price changes after examining
individual well production in Texas from 1990 to 2007. Anderson et al (2018) shows that
well pressure influences natural decline rates and is the primary factor governing the
production function, but not prices per se.
Other literature (Davis & Cairns, 1999; McDonald, 1994) cite production
constraints as a primary factors that inhibit prices from following the r-percent rule and
highlight how producers do not have complete autonomy with respect to resource
extraction.

Regulatory limitations regarding well spacing and down-hole pressure

(Anderson et al., 2018) prevent Hotelling’s net price from responding in kind to changes
in the market rate of interest.
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Understanding that production rates are not ruled by commodity prices in the short
run effectively transitions owner supply decisions away from near-term production
optimization, towards capital investment decisions to acquire new reserves. Critically,
producing firms must also deal with pragmatic considerations, such as mineral lease
expiration and debt servicing obligations, as other ancillary factors that influence behavior
of firms to maximize production despite adverse commodity price environments. This
expands the cost analysis from merely extraction or production cost to finding
(exploration) and development costs.
2.4 USER COST, RESOURCE RENT & SCARCITY
Economic theory has struggled with the measurement of scarcity for exhaustible
resources. Hotelling addresses the issues of scarcity, user cost or resource rent only
through his marginal cost net price formula (Hotelling, 1931). However, the issue of
measurability has been problematic given “conceptual shortcomings” and data that is not
“directly observable” (Farzin, 1992).
Alternatively, some economists have resorted to proxies of resource rent that
would be readily available. Brown and Field (1978) illustrated three different measures.
The first measure pertains to per unit production costs, although the data in this regard has
been decidedly biased towards declining long-run costs and can be influenced by
technological innovation or demand fluctuations.

The second scarcity measure is real

commodity prices, though the choice of price deflator has been ambiguous and has led to
widely varying results. For example, if mineral prices were compared to the price of
capital, real prices would have increased not declined (Jorgenson & Griliches, 1967).
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Moreover, when resource prices are compared to wages, mineral prices also declined on
a relative basis (Farzin, 1992). The third measure pertains to shadow prices or rental rates
of the value of in situ resource and the cost of competing substitutes, which can serve as
proxies for user cost (resource rent).
Adelman (1990) also states that, “oil value less development cost is discovery
value, or resource rent”. More formerly, Adelman (1991) states that the difference
between in-ground market value and the present value of expected increases in
development cost can approximate resource rent and the current value of development
cost can also be a proxy for resource rent. Despite difficulties in measuring scarcity,
Livernois and Uhler (1987) and Santopietro (1998) also argue that, discovery costs, are a
good approximations for resource scarcity value. Further, Lasserre (1985) and Devarajan
and Fisher (1982) also make an argument for discovery costs as an adequate proxy for
resource scarcity (rent).

However, Adelman et al., (1991)

warns that finding (or

discovery) costs are not directly observable, given that these expenditures may be made
over several years, not necessarily the year a discovery is added as a proved reserve.
Therefore, current development costs would be preferred over the combined finding and
development (F&D) cost metric to infer user cost.
2.5 RESOURCE DIFFERENTIALS
Theoretically, Ricardo (1821) discusses the impact of land differentials that create
surpluses (rent) for land owners with competitive advantages within the factors of
production. However, Miller & Upton (1985a,b), make no accommodations for reserve
differentials. For example, Ricardian differentials are evident from the standpoint of
17

reserve quality, where the percentage of proved undeveloped (PUDs) versus proved
developed producing (PDPs) reserves can be highly idiosyncratic. The quality of PUD
reserves is lower because future development capital is required to bring undeveloped
reserves into production. Indeed, undeveloped reserves should be discounted due to
higher financial and operational risk that is necessary to bring these barrels to market.
Thus, highlighting how not all barrels in-the-ground are homogeneous.

18

2.6 CONCEPTS & TERMS
The following table presents the terms used for this empirical study.
Term

Explanation

Crude Oil Equivalent – Boe,
Mcf.

Converting gas volumes to the oil equivalent is
done based on the heating content or calorific
value of the fuel. Before aggregating, the gas
volumes first must be converted to the same
temperature and pressure. Common industry gas
conversion factors usually range between 1.0
barrel of oil equivalent (Boe) = 5.6 thousand
standard cubic feet of gas (Mcf) to 1.0 Boe = 6.0
Mcf. (SPE, 2021)
Exploration & Production company.
The percentage of a developed proved oil and gas
reserves that is produced annually. Calculated as
the inverse of the developed Reserve Life Index.
Finding and development (F&D) refers to costs
incurred when a company purchases, researches
and develops properties to establish commodity
reserves. (EIA, 2011)
The per barrel value of proven oil and gas reserves
that have not been extracted.
Production costs (also called lifting costs) are the
costs to operate and maintain wells and related
equipment and facilities per barrel of oil
equivalent (Boe) of oil and gas produced by those
facilities after the hydrocarbons have been found,
acquired, and developed for production. Direct
lifting costs are total production spending minus
production taxes (and minus royalties in foreign
regions) divided by oil and natural gas production
in Boe. Total lifting costs are the sum of direct
lifting costs and production taxes. (EIA, 2011)
Reserves are those quantities of hydrocarbons
which are anticipated to be commercially
recovered from known accumulations from a
given date forward.(SPE, 2021)

E&P
Extraction Rate – (Production)

F&D Cost

In-Ground Value
Production Cost – (Lifting
Cost)

Oil & Gas Reserve

19

Reserve-To-Production Ratio or The reserves-to-production ratio or R/P is a
Reserve Life Index
method used to assess the size of reserves. The
value represents the number of years that current
reserves would last if their rate of use did not
change. The value of this ratio changes as the size
of the reserve changes. A reserve is defined as the
amount of a resource that can be extracted with
current technology, at current prices. If technology
improves, or prices increase, the reserves
increase.(Univ. of Calgary, 2015)
Resource Rent
The economic rent of a natural resource equals
the value of capital services flows rendered by the
natural resources, or their share in the gross
operating surplus; its value is given by the value of
extraction. Resource rent may be divided between
depletion and return to natural capital.(OECD,
2001a)
Risk Adjustment Factor
Applying a risk-adjustment factor reduces a
property’s volumes or cash flows to capture
uncertainties linked with realizing less-thanproved reserve categories. As reserve reports for
O&G properties commonly reflect grossproduction volumes, it’s typical to apply
adjustments based on the degree of certainty.
(Burgess, 2016)
Standard Measure for Oil &
The FASB’s ASC 932 requires a similar
Gas (SMOG)
standardized measure for the value of proved
reserves called SMOG (standardized measure
of oil and gas). SMOG is calculated with the same
methodology as PV-10 but deducts income taxes
whereas PV-10 does not. Both PV-10
and SMOG require (1): reserve estimates (2): a
sales price and (3): an estimate of cost. (Burgess,
2016)
User Cost
Depletion cost or the cost incurred over a period
by the owner of a fixed asset or consumer durable
because of using it to provide a flow of capital or
consumption of services. User cost consists of the
depreciation on the asset or durable plus the
capital, or interest, cost. (OECD, 2001b)
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3. HYPOTHESES
Empirically capturing the market value of in-ground resources using the Hotelling
Valuation Principle has been elusive. HVP tends to overshoot its estimate of reserve value
in virtually all but the first Miller and Upton (1985a) paper, which examined a period of
very high oil prices and anxiety over supply scarcity. Adelman et al (1991) states that the
market value of an in-ground undeveloped reserve is a good measure of mineral scarcity.
HVP’s net price, however, consistently assigns an equal value to both proven reserve
categories, despite undeveloped reserves lower quality due to its additional capital
requirements. Accordingly, this is paper posits that HVP is more closely aligned with
developed producing reserves, rather than undeveloped reserves, which appear to be
heavily discounted accept during periods of upward price shocks.
Indeed, production costs, the second component of HVP’s net price (Price – marginal
production cost) , are simply not applicable to undeveloped reserves, as those resources
are not in production. HVP’s mispricing of undeveloped reserves can be particularly acute
in this era of shale development where producing firms increased their total proven
reserves by nearly double from 2008 to 2014, while undeveloped reserves increased by
roughly twofold (DeSantis, 2018).
Prior literature (Adelman & Watkins, 1995), mention a stylized fact among industry
practitioners that one-half of net price is a better approximation to explain reserve value.
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Likewise, additional studies find evidence to support the use of one-half net price (Davis
& Cairns, 1999). However, these studies used private transactions or third party reserve
valuations and in some cases regional rather than firm specific cost data (Adelman &
Watkins, 1995);(Davis & Cairns, 1999). This paper looks beyond the one-half net price
discount with an examination of the relationship between net price and developed inground reserve value. This study also incorporates company specific costs, reserve, and
market value data after the introduction of shale technology, which should add further
insight to the Hotelling Valuation Principle.
To empirically establish the linkage between developed reserves and HVP’s net price,
this paper proposes the following analysis:
HYPOTHESIS (1): A Net Price structure is more closely associated with values of
proven developed in-ground reserves, than total (developed and undeveloped) in-ground
reserves.
A key assumption of Hotelling’s theory is that the stock of inventory is fixed and there
is no limit placed on the rate of extraction. However, real-world experience shows firms
continually look to replace produced reserves and operate in an environment where
production is regulated by geologic and regulatory constraints. Prior literature argues that
these constraints are the as reasons why net price has not risen with the rate of interest
(Adelman, 1993); (Adelman et al., 1991);(Cairns & Davis, 1998).
To account for these observed well economics, this paper adopts a net price factor
methodology. Specifically, a two-factor model is applied for developed reserves. The
first factor involves an extraction rate formula representing the time in years until proven
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developed reserves are fully exploited, which offsets HVP’s assumption of instantaneous
extraction. The second factor is a discount rate or risk adjustment factor that incorporates
the execution risk involved with the production of developed reserves. The risk factor is
particularly important regarding the sub-set of reserves that are categorized as proved
developed non-producing (PDNP) reserves. These PDNP reserves are slightly riskier, as
they may require minor well completions or involve reserves behind the casing of existing
wells (“behind pipe”) that are expected to be produced in the predictable future (SPE,
2021). Notably, the practice of discounting reserves for varying degrees of reserve risk is
widely implemented among practitioners (Burgess, 2016).
The application of the factors is once again drawn from Adelman (1990) and
Adelman et al (1991) who present a formula that is appropriate for a developed reserves,
given the assumption of no additional capital requirements to produce these reserves.
As shown in eq. 2, net price converges towards the wellhead value per barrel as the pace
of extraction increases.
𝑉/𝑃 = 𝑎⁄(𝑎 + 𝑖)

(2)

V it = Value per barrel for firm i at time t.
P it = Price less costs and taxes for firm i at time t.
a it = Extraction rate for firm i at time t.
i it = Discount rate for firm i at time t.
A firm’s recent production-to-reserves ratio is employed as a proxy for the reserve
extraction rate. This paper extends the literature with the use of developed reserves in the
calculation of the extraction measure, which is a more accurate metric given that
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undeveloped reserves are not available to be exploited without further investment. In
addition, a measure for risk is applied to the two-factor developed reserve model. This
discount rate is also aligned with industry surveys regarding developed and undeveloped
reserve valuation.
To better quantify the associated risks of hydrocarbon extraction, this paper proposes
a modified HVP model and the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS (2): A Two-Factor net price structure adjusted for extraction and risk
factors, has higher explanatory power than the base HVP net price structure.
As Santopietro (1998) explains, the theoretical price for a depletable natural
resource includes two parts, production cost and user cost. El-Serafy states, that surplus
value is derived from true income, which can be consumed, and a separate measure for
depletion cost or the amount that is needed to be reinvested for future consumption
(Santopietro, 1998).

However, Miller and Upton’s (1985a) net price framework only

considers production cost. This simplified cost structure is perhaps a key reason why
HVP has continually overestimated in-ground reserve values. A more complete structure
should include user cost, that would account for the development capital needed for
undeveloped reserves.

After including this user cost, true resource rent can be

approximated. Hence, the user cost factor is incorporated into the prior two-factor model
to form a three-factor model for total (developed and undeveloped) reserve valuation.
The risk adjustment factor also increases from the two-factor model given the
higher risk profile associated with proven undeveloped reserves. This risk discount is
even more important with the adoption of a reporting rule after 2008 that requires aging
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undeveloped reserves to be removed from the proven category if those barrels are not
developed after five years (Burgess, 2016).
To incorporate the user cost factor, this paper proposes a three-factor HVP model
and the following hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS (3): A Three-Factor net price structure incorporating extraction, risk
and user cost factors is expected to have a significantly positive correlation with total inground reserve values.
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4. METHODOLOGY
4.1 DATA SAMPLE
The data for this study is constructed based on Ernst & Young’s annual industry
survey, which covers the 50 largest oil and gas producers in the U.S. Ernst & Young is
an independent third-party accounting and consulting firm with an established presence
in the upstream oil and gas industry. Companies with a disproportionate amount of nonupstream oil and gas assets, such as integrated energy companies in the mold of Exxon or
Chevron that engage in downstream oil refining were omitted. Also, sample firms that
maintain significant operations offshore or outside the U.S. and Western Canada were
also excluded.
However, eight more firms were added to the sample, due in part to their
consistent operations over the test period and their data availability. The final sample
size consists of 273 observations representing 61 oil and gas companies. Note: The
company count increased slightly, as firms engaged in mergers where company A and B
in the early years of the test period would merge to form company C in the subsequent
years. In comparison, the first Miller & Upton (1985a) study used 94 observations.
The sample period for this study is from 2015 to 2020, near the nadir of the
COVID-19 capital market price shock. This six-year dataset includes a full commodity
price cycle, with oil prices at the beginning of the sample period exceeding $100 per
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barrel during the shale revolution, then falling to an average annual price below $50 a
barrel in 2016 and 2017 and then subsequently, a further decline to $20 a barrel during
the COVID selloff. Natural gas also experienced the same volatility, with a 62% decline
over the six-year period.
This sample period is compared to Miller and Upton’s (1985a,b) research that
represented observations from 1979-1983, where crude oil varied on an inflation
adjusted basis, between $60 and $132 per barrel (Macrotrends, 2021).
The data pertaining to stock prices, reserves, costs, and financial statements is
provided by FactSet, Inc., which is an independent third-party financial data-base
provider. This resource is also supplemented with 10k annual company reports.
Importantly, all operational data related to reserves, costs and financial statement data
were collected as of yearend for each respective firm. However, given the ninety-day
window for public firms to report their yearend results, all stock and commodity price
data is priced as of quarter end or March 31st.
4.2 EMPIRICAL MODELS
To test the Hotelling Valuation Principle, this paper addresses three constructs
that should improve the empirical validity of HVP theory. Each model is evaluated for
goodness of fit and the magnitude of the net price coefficient.
A. BASE MODEL
The base model attempts to illustrate that HVP’s net price has a stronger
association with the in-ground value of developed versus total reserves.
𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑉𝑇,𝐷 = 𝛼 + 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝐶 + 𝜀
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(3)

Where,

EIGVT,D it = Total or developed reserve in-ground enterprise value for
firm i at time t.
Net Price it = Price minus marginal production cost for firm i at time t.
C it = Control for firm size and leverage
𝛼 it = Intercept for firm i at time t.

ε it = Error term for firm i at time t.
The enterprise in-ground value of total reserves (EIGVT) is one of two dependent
variables. The second, relates to the enterprise in-ground value of developed reserves
(EIGVD). Both dependent variables (EIGVT and EIGVD) are oil equivalent per barrel
metrics. The base model HVP net price model is tested against the market values of both
reserve types to determine its empirical efficacy.
Firm market capitalization is calculated using the quarter-end common share
prices and shares outstanding, which is later adjusted lower for non-upstream oil and gas
producing assets. These non-upstream assets could include downstream, oil and gas
refinery operations, mid-stream pipeline infrastructure or investments in other exploration
and production related companies.
The enterprise value measure used in EIGVT/D, is calculated as the market value
of each firm’s net long-term debt plus equity market capitalization. In those few
instances where the market value of debt is not available, book value is substituted.
Accordingly, cash and cash equivalents are deducted from the total to arrive at an
enterprise value that is divided by each firm’s total barrels of proven oil equivalent
reserves, which equals the enterprise in-ground value of proven reserves on a per barrel
basis.
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Net price is the primary independent variable in this analysis and represents the
per barrel wellhead profit for producing firms. To calculate this measure, each firm’s
percentage of oil versus natural gas production is weighted and applied to the oil
equivalent price. Once revenue has been determined, the oil equivalent production cost is
subtracted to arrive at net price. The revenue and cost breakdown for net price is
presented as follows:
(𝑄

)

(𝑄

)

(𝑃𝐺𝑎𝑠 )

𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = (𝑃 − 𝐶) = {((𝑄 𝑂𝑖𝑙 )) (𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑙 ) + ((𝑄𝐺𝑎𝑠 )) (
𝐵𝑜𝑒

Where,

𝐵𝑜𝑒

6

)} − (𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑜𝑒 )

(4)

(P – C) it = Net Price for firm i at time t.
QOil it = Percentage of oil production for firm i at time t.
QGas it = Percentage of gas production for firm i at time t.
QBoe it = Total oil equivalent production for firm i at time t.
𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑙

it

= Market price of crude oil at time t.

𝑃𝐺𝑎𝑠 it = Market price of natural gas at time t.
ECBoe it = Oil equivalent production cost of firm i at time t.

Notably, this net price methodology is slightly different from Miller &
Upton (1985a,b) who calculated each firm’s commodity weighting using reserves rather
than production. This could result in a revenue differential from our model, as some
firms may choose to overweight or underweight their commodity mix based on favorable
pricing differentials or possibly lease or regulatory constraints.
For clarification, the crude oil price represents West Texas Intermediate (WTI)
grade crude oil per barrel, as of quarter-end or March 31st for the years 2015 to 2020.
The natural gas price represents Henry Hub spot pipeline quality gas quoted in U.S.
dollars per million Btu or 1 Mcf of pipeline quality-gas. The price of natural gas is
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converted to an oil equivalent ratio of 6:1 per industry standard. Commodity prices and
per unit production cost data is provided by FactSet, Inc. Production costs included lease
operating expense, transportation costs and severance or non-income taxes.
CONTROLS
Given wide variances within this data set regarding firm size and leverage, control
variables were utilized. Firm size is measured using common share market capitalization
(shares outstanding multiplied by the common share price) and a leverage ratio, which is
equivalent to the long-term debt to capital ratio (long-term debt divided by shareholders
equity plus long-term debt).
As shown in Table 1, the average firm market capitalization is $9.7 billion, with a
considerably lower median capitalization of $3.5 billion and a range of $19 million to
$76.7 billion. This small capitalization skew is adjusted for with a large cap dummy
variable, which is equal to 1 for companies with market capitalizations greater than $15
billion, 20% percent of the observations in the data set meet this criterion.
B. TWO-FACTOR MODEL – DEVELOPED RESERVES
The two-factor model for developed reserves is presented below. Equation 5
presents the baseline regression analysis that also adds controls for firm size and
leverage. Additionally, to test for non-linearity between net price and the dependent
variable EIGVD, the net price independent variable is squared. Further, a first
differencing model is employed to gauge significance while controlling for omitted
variables or autocorrelation within the error terms and non-stationarity in the time series.
Two-Factor developed reserve model,
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𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑉𝐷 = 𝛼 + {(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) ∗ (𝐸𝑅/(𝐸𝑅 + 𝑅𝐴𝐹)} + 𝐶 + 𝜀

(5)

Where, EIGVD it = Developed reserve in-ground enterprise value for firm i at time t.
Net Price it = Price minus marginal production cost for firm i at time t.
𝐸𝑅 it = Extraction rate for firm i at time t.

RAF it = 10% risk adjustment factor at time t.
C it = Control for firm size and leverage
𝛼 it = Intercept for firm i at time t.

ε it = Error term for firm i at time t.
EXTRACTION RATE
The reserve extraction rate is the second factor in the two-factor developed and
three-factor total reserve models. This is calculated as annual oil equivalent production
per barrel divided by developed reserves per barrel, which represents the annual rate of
extraction until all developed reserves have been fully exploited. The reserve extraction
rate factor offsets one of Hotelling’s implied assumptions of unconstrained production
(Davis & Cairns, 1999).
The Extraction Rate factor is calculated as follows.

𝐸𝑅 =
ER

it

𝑄𝐵𝑜𝑒

(6)

𝑃𝐷𝑃

= Proved reserve extraction rate for firm i at time t.

QBoe it = Annual oil equivalent extraction for firm i at time t.
PDP it = Proved developed producing reserves for firm i at time t.
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RISK
In addition, to the rate of extraction and user cost, this paper also provides
measures for risk that are primarily a reflection of reserve quality. Moreover, discounting
for risk is also consistent among market participants and industry practitioners. The
Society of Petroleum Evaluation Engineers (SPEE) in their annual 2016, 2017 and 2018
industry surveys found that producers generally apply a 10% discount rate for proved
developed producing reserves (Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 2019). The Texas
Comptroller of Public Accountant also found in their 2020 market survey that corporate
and property transactions were discounted within a wide range of 10.52% and 17.79%
based on reserve quality and risk (Texas Comptroller, 2020). Adelman (1990) highlights
a long held consensus rate of return of 9% among petroleum engineers, and that from
World War II to 1973, the extraction rate has been approximately close to the discount
rate.
Therefore, for developed reserves, this paper applies a 10% risk adjustment factor.
For the riskier, proven undeveloped reserve category, a risk adjustment factor is applied
that is also consistent with annual SPEE industry surveys of 20% (Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management, 2019).
C. THREE-FACTOR MODEL – TOTAL RESERVES
User cost is the final component of the three-factor model for total reserve
valuation. It is defined as the discounted future development cost that is necessary to
bring proved undeveloped reserves into production. Every year producing firms are
required to generate a standard measure of expected future cash flows under FASB ACS
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932, which is based on a firm’s proven reserves, recent commodity prices and expected
production costs and development expenditures. Adelman et al. (1991) describes the
difference between in-ground value and development cost as discovery value or resource
rent, which can be approximated through current development cost. See equations 8 and
9 for the user cost variable derivation.
Accordingly, for this analysis, the Adelman et al., (1991) theory of rent is utilized;
where the present value of development costs approximates user cost. This metric is
preferred because it is a direct measure of the costs necessary to bring current PUD
reserves to market; unlike historical development expenses that are problematic to
allocate to annual per barrel reserve additions.
The three-factor model is also presented with control variables (eq. 7) for firm
size and leverage. Net Price is also squared, and first differencing is incorporated with
the main models.
Three-Factor total reserve model,

𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑉𝑇 = 𝛼 + {(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) ∗ (𝐸𝑅⁄(𝐸𝑅 + 𝑅𝐴𝐹 + 𝑈𝐶))} + 𝐶 + 𝜀
Where, EIGVT it = Total reserve in-ground enterprise value for firm i at time t.
Net Price it = Price minus marginal production cost for firm i at time t.
ER it = Extraction rate for firm i at time t.

𝑈𝐶 it = User cost factor of firm i at time t.
RAF it = 20% risk adjustment factor at time t.
C it = Control for firm size and leverage
𝛼 it = Intercept for firm i at time t.
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(7)

ε it = Error term for firm i at time t.

Development costs are not discounted in the SEC’s standard measure (only net
cash flows are discounted at 10%). Therefore, this paper introduces an alternative
discounting methodology. This process utilizes each firm’s developed reserve life as the
discount rate, and number of years necessary to exhaust the developed reserve base.
Adelman (1991) discusses how the present value of expected increase in development
cost approximates user cost. Once user cost is calculated, this metric is inverted to
provide a discount factor, which is later applied to net price within the three-factor total
reserve model.
The discounting formula is outlined as follows.
𝑃𝑉𝐷 = 𝐹𝑉𝐷 (

1
1 𝑅𝐿𝐼
(1+ )
𝑅𝐿𝐼

)

(8)

Where, PVD it = Present value of future development cost for firm i at time t.
FVD

it

= Future value of development cost for firm i at time t.

RLI

it

= Annual reserve life of developed reserves for firm i at time t.

PVD, provides a discounted annual development cost expenditure for each firm in the
sample. PVD is used to determine user cost per barrel of proved undeveloped reserves.
User cost per barrel is derived with the following.

𝑈𝐶 =

1
𝑃𝑉𝐷
(
⁄𝑃𝑈𝐷)

Where,
UC

it

= User Cost for firm i at time t.
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(9)

PVD

it

= Present value of expected development costs for firm i at time t.

PUD

it

= Proved undeveloped reserves in equivalent barrels for firm i at time t.

ROBUSTNESS CHECK
A series of regressions were run to crosscheck EIGVT versus the SEC’s standard
measure of oil and gas value, two popular relative value metrics, and against the two
commodity producer types. Each check is performed via a panel (or pooling) regression
over the sample period, that include the two- or three-factor net price variable, and controls
for firm size and leverage. The first analysis tests the accuracy of a producing firm’s
standard measure of reserve value based on firm fundamentals; this is essentially a
discounted cash flow exercise that is required in oil and gas company reporting. This
should provide a fundamental methodology consistent with financial theory to benchmark
against the net price method. The standard measure is constructed according to FASB ASC
932. This methodology involves projecting each firm’s net cash flows over the life of the
reserve, which is discounted at a 10% rate to determine a present value. The present value
is divided by each firm’s proven reserve barrels to determine a per unit valuation, which is
regressed against the dependent variable, EIGVT (along with net price and firm controls).
This should provide a fundamental methodology consistent with financial theory to
benchmark against the net price method.
In addition, the dependent variable EIGVT was regressed against the Enterprise
Value to EBITDA and Price to Book ratios as a comparison to the explanatory power of
net price. The denominators for each metric were taken from the prior reporting year, while

35

market prices were tabulated at the end of the first quarter. The observations with negative
book values were deleted from the price-to-book regression.
Furthermore, as a measure of total reserve replacement value, finding and
development (F&D) cost per barrel is analyzed as an independent variable. This widely
utilized metric among industry participants is calculated on an organic basis (ex. price
revisions, acquisitions, and divestitures) over a three-year average, per industry standard
(SPE, 2021). However, given the number of outliers in this distribution, the series was
winsorized at the 2% level on both the upper and lower tails. The developed reserve value
(EIGVT) is then regressed against the two-factor model and the F&D cost metric and firm
controls.
Finally, a subsample regression on the net price of oil weighted producers versus
natural gas weighted producers was conducted as a robustness check. A firm is categorized
as an oil (natural gas) producer if its oil (natural gas) production exceeds a two-thirds
threshold of total equivalent production.

On average, the firms within this sample

produced 57% oil and 43% natural gas.
4.3 DATA ANALYSIS
To test HVP’s net price construct, linear regressions by means of panel data were
utilized and coded in the R statistical software package. Initial summary tables with
descriptive statistics are provided, along with a corresponding correlation table that
includes the primary variables in the regression analysis.

The first regression in equation 3, tests the original Miller & Upton (1985a) HVP net
price theory with the dependent variable, EIGVT for total reserves, versus the independent
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variable, net price, as defined in equation (4). Once the original HVP net price model is
benchmarked, a comparison regression is run that changes the dependent variable from
total reserve EIGVT to the developed reserve enterprise in-ground value (EIGVD). This
addresses this paper’s first hypothesis that compares net price to developed reserve value
versus total (developed and undeveloped) reserve value.
To examine this paper’s second hypothesis, the EIGVD dependent variable is
regressed against the two-factor model (eq. 5). The extraction rate is accounted for with
equation 6 and risk is discussed in the Risk section. In addition, two checks for nonlinearity in the net price variable and a first differencing model is also run to check for
autocorrelation among the residuals.
For the third and final hypothesis, the EIGVT dependent variable is regressed against
the three-factor model. The three-factor model (eq. 7) incorporates user cost into the
prior model to explain total in-ground reserve value. The user cost factor compensates
reserve owners for the additional capital and resources needed to move a barrel of
undeveloped reserves to the developed producing reserve category. The discounting
methodology for future development cost, and the corresponding calculation of user cost
is provided in equations 8 and 9. Similar to the testing of the two-factor model, the threefactor model will also be tested versus a non-linear and a first difference model.
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5. RESULTS
This paper addresses the empirical validity of Miller and Upton’s (1985a) Hotelling
Valuation Principle. Previous studies of HVP generally overvalue in-ground reserves of
nonrenewable natural resources. This paper incorporates a resource rent framework that
adjusts the HVP net price model to account for reserve quality, the reserve extraction rate,
a user cost, and a discount rate. Unlike prior empirical test that used third party consultants
or brokerage research to estimate in-ground market value of firm reserves, this paper
compiles and tabulates a wide-ranging dataset of public oil and gas company data.
Figure 1 shows oil and gas prices over the period of 2014-2020, which covers a full
boom and bust commodity cycle. The oil price was about $100 per barrel and the natural
gas price was above $4 per Mcf in 2014, which was the first year of reserve and cost data
in this survey. The oil price trended in a lower range between $38 and nearly $65 per barrel
between 2015-2019, and then subsequently declined as low as $20 per barrel during the
onset of the COVID pandemic. Natural gas prices followed a similar trend, ranging
between $1.96 and $3.19 per Mcf between 2015-2019, with an average of 2.49 (Table 1)
and low of $1.64 in 2020. The price of natural gas has been depressed over this timeframe
because of oversupply, due in part to associated gas production from oil shale.
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Table 1 presents the summary statistics. The average Enterprise In-Ground Value
of total reserves (EIGVT) over the sample period is $9.06 per barrel, while the average
Developed Enterprise In-Ground Value of producing reserves (EIGVD) is $15.83 per
barrel. The average Net Price is $18.85 per barrel with a 25th and 75th percentile range of
$7.10 and $29.42, respectively. This result is in line with the industry rule of thumb
mentioned by Adelman (1990). In comparison, the per barrel in-ground value of developed
reserves represents a discount of 16% to net price. Figure 2 shows that Net Price reached
the peak in 2018 as oil and gas prices increased while production costs trended lower due
to further industry cost cutting.
The components to estimate Net Price per barrel are Realized Oil Equivalent Price
and Production Cost. The average Realized Oil Equivalent Price is $27.08 per barrel,
while the average oil price is $47.69. This discrepancy reveals the significant price
dispersion between oil and natural gas. Meanwhile, the average production cost is $8.23
per barrel with a standard deviation of $4.33 per barrel.

Figure 3 illustrates a declining

trend of production cost after 2016, caused in part by improving fracking and production
efficiencies (Energy Information Agency, 2016).
Reserve replacement cost, which is approximated with the Finding and
Development (F&D) cost metric averaged $16.30 a barrel, highlighting a full replacement
cycle or all-in average cost structure of $24.53 a barrel. However, F&D cost varied widely
with a standard deviation almost as large as the mean and range between $2.59 and $85.51
a barrel (both figures were winsorized at the 2% level).
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The average development cost to convert proved undeveloped reserves to
producing reserves averaged $14.18 a barrel or 87% of the total finding and development
cost measure. This contrasts Adelman et al (1991) who reported that finding costs averaged
approximately one-half of development costs between 1974 and 1986. The average
Reserve Extraction Factor or production rate is measured at 14.9% per annum with a
median of 14.1%. This low variance reveals a surprisingly consistent rate of extraction for
developed reserves among producing firms in the sample. In addition, the User Cost
Factor within this dataset averaged 30.7% with a median of 22.4%, while the 25th and 75th
percentile ranged between 15.1% and 30.3%, respectively. The Two-Factor Net Price and
Three-Factor Net Price variables came in at $10.95 and $4.88 per barrel, respectively.
E&P firms within this sample carried a fair amount of debt. The average Leverage
Ratio for the composite firms is 50% and that varied between 32% (25th percentile) and
55% (75th percentile). Moreover, conventional relative valuation ratios including the
Enterprise Value to EBITDA and Price to Book ratios average 9.8x and 1.7x, respectively,
over the six-year sample period. The average SEC In-Ground value of proven reserves per
barrel is $6.71. The average Market Capitalization of sample firms is in the small-to-midcap range, between $1.2 billion (25th percentile) and $12 billion (75th percentile). The
average for the Large Cap Dummy variable is .198 with a standard deviation of .399.
Table 2 shows that Enterprise In-Ground Value (EIGVT) and Developed Enterprise
In-Ground Value, (EIGVD) are moderately correlated and significant with Net Price
(.42,.43), the Realized Oil Equivalent Price (.42,.41), the Two-Factor Net Price (.42,.44)
and the Three-Factor Net Price (.39) . Unsurprisingly, both EIGVT and EIGVD are
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strongly correlated at 0.93.

There is also a discrepancy with Production Cost that is

significant at -.12 to EIGVT but shows no significance with EIGVD. This is possibly due to
the sunk cost nature of developed producing reserves versus PUD reserves, where
development activities could be deferred due to cost sensitivity.
The only negatively correlated variables that show significance to EIGVT and
EIGVD are the Leverage Ratio (-.24,-.23) and User Cost Factor (-0.24,-0.18), respectively.
Notably, the Reserve Extraction Factor shows virtually no correlation at .01 and .06 to
EIGVT/D, highlighting that reserve extraction does not vary too much on an annual basis
for producing reserves. Among the independent variables, there does not appear to be any
notable relationships except for Production Cost and the User Cost Factor, which are -0.47
negatively correlated.

This may reflect the notion that cash flows available for

development (proxy for User Cost) will decline if there is an increase in production cost.
Table 3 presents the regression results for the enterprise in-ground value of total
proven reserves (EIGVT) against the base HVP model shown in equation 3. In addition,
the HVP net price is tested versus developed enterprise in-ground reserve value (EIGVD),
which is subsequently tested with controls for firm size and leverage. The last two columns
test the combined net price model for non-linearity (4) and for omitted variables or
autocorrelation via the first differencing statistical technique (5). Model (1) shows the base
HVP net price with a correlation coefficient of 0.28, which is significantly below 1, as
prescribed and theorized by; Davis & Cairns (1998) and Miller and Upton (1985a).
Moreover, the intercept is also significant and relatively large at 3.71, which indicates that
there may be an omitted variable that is not accounted for in net price.
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Importantly, Model (2) in Table 3, regresses net price versus EIGVD. The results
show noticeable improvement with a slope coefficient nearly twice Model (1). Also, the
regression’s fit improves to .189.

However, the intercept remains relatively large and

highly significant. This is compared to Adelman’s (1991) findings, which showed that the
in-ground market value of reserves usually trades at one-half of net price. The combined
net price model in column (3) sees a meaningful increase in explanatory power (R2 = 0.26)
with the addition of control variables for firm size and leverage. Moreover, when stress
tested with the regressions in column (4) and (5), the model holds up well with net price
remaining significant, and quite linear (column 4). In addition, autocorrelation within the
error terms is also in check as shown in model (5) via the first differencing method.
Table 4 shows regression results for the two-factor model and its ability to explain
in-ground market value of developed reserves (EIGVD). This two-factor model examines
a discounted net price using an extraction rate factor and a risk discount rate of 10%.
Model (1) reveals a net price variable that is sufficiently close to one and is significant at
explaining the variation in EIGVD, with an R2 improvement to .194%. Column (2) displays
the two-factor model with controls for firm size and leverage that shows a large
improvement in fit with an R2 of .278, while still maintaining a high slope coefficient of
0.95. In addition, Columns (3) and (4) yielded consistent results once again after testing
for net price non-linearity and autocorrelation in the residuals that were not significant.
The regression results in Table 5 present the three-factor model, which regresses
the total reserve in-ground value (EIGVT) against the three-factor net price. Once again,
the three-factor variable is quite good with a significant slope coefficient of 0.98. However,
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the explanatory power of the model appears to decline slightly from the two-factor model
with an R2 of .153. The three-factor model with controls does, however, improve its fit to
.303 and maintains a robust slope estimate of .87. However, Model (3) does show the
three-factor net price coefficient (-0.08) as significant, indicating that the net price
relationship does weaken slightly as EIGVT increases. This is relationship is notable but
does not invalidate the regression, it only qualifies the interaction. Intuitively, as net price
increases, EIGVT increases at a smaller rate. This is observed in periods of upward
commodity price shocks, where commodity price moves outpace related market values,
which tend to adjust more slowly than commodity price at the extremes. Lastly, column
(6) shows a good fit after detrending the residuals via a first difference model.
Table 6 reports the results of robustness checks. Models (1)-(3) examine the
relationship between total reserve value with traditional valuation metrics, including the
SEC’s standard measure of proven reserve value, Enterprise Value to EBITDA Ratio and
Price to Book Ratio. The results show the three-factor model remains significant when
regressed with the SEC’s standard measure and controls. Encouragingly, the three-factor
net price also retained a significant slope coefficient near unity when combined with the
Enterprise to EBITDA ratio, which was also significant, and the combined model generated
the highest R2 of any model at 0.385. Meanwhile, the Price to Book ratio was insignificant
and only produced a slope coefficient of .17, while the three-factor net price variable
maintained a high slope coefficient and strong significance level. Industry practitioners
have generally used EV/EBITDA as their primary relative value measure, so it is not
unreasonable that it fared better than Price to Book.
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Model (4) in Table 6 shows the two-factor net price that is combined with the
finding and development (F&D) costs per barrel metric, which is the SEC’s other required
measure in annual 10-k company reports. The results for model (4) show a low coefficient
for both the two-factor net price and F&D measures, and only the net price metric is
significant.

The unresponsiveness of the F&D variable is primarily due to the industry’s

calculation methodology, which tabulates costs over a three-year average given the lag
between exploration spending and when reserves are recognized as proved reserves.
Models (5) and (6) in Table 6 presents the sub-sample regression results. The
sample is divided into oil producers versus natural gas weighted producers. If a firm
produces more than two-thirds oil (natural gas) of their total production, then that firm
would be deemed an oil (natural gas) focused producer. The coefficient of net price is 0.74
for the oil producer sub-sample and 0.98 for the natural gas sub-sample. The R2 is also
much higher for the natural gas sub-sample regression at 0.317 versus just 0.200 for the oil
producer sub-sample regression. This higher explanatory power for natural gas producers
maybe the result of higher natural gas price volatility. The annual standard deviation of
natural gas prices was 44%, while the standard deviation of oil producers was 33% over
the period of 2014 to 2020.
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6. CONCLUSION
6.1 INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS
This paper extends Hotelling Valuation Principle theory (Miller & Upton, 1985a,b)
by developing a resource rent framework to incorporate a more realistic and complete cost
structure of producing firms. The two-factor and three-factor models proposed in this
paper provide an empirical footing and quantifiable measures to account for the user cost,
risk, and reserve extraction constraints that resource owners must balance to optimally reinvest and exploit a nonrenewable resource.
In Table 3, results demonstrate that the explanatory power of HVP increases by
differentiating between developed and undeveloped reserves ( Model (1) vs. Model (2)).
The coefficient of net price improved from 0.28 to 0.52 and the R2 increased from .177 to
.189. This paper empirically captures this discrepancy between developed and undeveloped
reserves among conventional oil and gas companies. In addition, after controlling for wideranging firm heterogeneity regarding firm size and leverage, this developed reserve net
price model improves its fit with an R2 of 0.262. Overall, the models in Table 4 show
higher explanatory power when net price is regressed against developed in-ground reserve
values, as compared to total in-ground reserve values, which supports Hypothesis 1.
A two-factor developed reserve model is introduced to quantify the one-half price
discount mentioned by Adelman et al (1991) and increase the explanatory power of net
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price. This model empirically applies Adelman’s developed reserve formula (eq. 2) to the
in-ground market value of oil and gas reserves, which shows that the value of a developed
reserve changes with its rate of extraction, less its risk adjusted discount rate. Interestingly,
Table 4 reveals that the two-factor net price has a coefficient 0.91, which is identical to
Miller and Upton (1985a), although the two-factor model’s R2 is lower at .197 vs .408 for
Miller and Upton.
Thompson (2001) applies a production capacity (extraction rate) model and the
Miller and Upton model against a sample of E&P companies. The results were significant
but generated very low net price coefficients using 53 observations (49 excluding nonupstream companies) over a nine-month period that utilized average versus spot oil and
gas prices. However, when Thompson applied the original Miller and Upton (1985a)
model that accounted for development investment, the results were noticeably improved
and generated significant (but still low) coefficients versus the original HVP model that
did not account for development cost.
Importantly, the two-factor model in Table 4 is superior to the original HVP net
price model in Table 3 regarding developed reserves, as the former produced significantly
higher coefficients (β= 0.91, 0.52) and higher R2 (.197,.189). These results support
Hypothesis 2 and effectively quantify the one-half net price discount mentioned by
Adelman (1991). Prior studies (Magliolo, 1986;Adelman, 1990;Adelman et al., 1991;
Adelman & Watkins, 1995; Watkins, 1992; Johnsen et al., 1996;Thompson, 2001) failed
to consistently achieve a coefficient close to unity beyond Miller and Upton (1985a), with
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the exception of those examining royalty trusts (i.e. Crain & Jamal, 1991;Miller & Upton,
1985b). However, royalty trust’s reserves are primarily within the developed category.
The three-factor model also contributes favorably to prior HVP literature. The first
model in Table 6 illustrates the ability of the three-factor methodology to explain total inground reserve value, which produced robust regression metrics (β= 0.96, R2=.156) that
positively confirm the assertions in Hypothesis 3. This outcome is meaningful after many
inconclusive attempts to extend Hotelling Valuation Principle theory (Miller &
Upton,1985a). It is also noteworthy that this analysis produces significant results despite
this sample’s generally weak commodity price environment with WTI crude oil falling to
$20 a barrel in 2020. This is counter to the strong price levels witnessed by Miller and
Upton over the period of 1979 to 1981. Secondly, this study provides an apples-to-apples
comparison with Miller and Upton’s (1985a) study, with reserve market values that where
derived from actual stock and bond market exchanges rather than market values imputed
by third party research firms or from private transactions where information is limited.
Lastly, the results from this study are relevant and sustainable given that the energy
industry has experienced tremendous changes during the sample period. Over this time,
new disruptive fracking technology and unconventional drilling techniques were
introduced, which reinvigorated production. In addition, this sample period captures
observations within an industry that is dealing with climate change policies and a secular
transformation away from hydrocarbon fuel sources to renewable clean energy
technologies.
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6.2 IMPLICATIONS
From a practitioner’s viewpoint, this extension of the Hotelling Valuation
Principle model could provide a pragmatic valuation tool to overcome the weakness of the
industry’s standard DCF valuation methodology, which has consistently undervalued
nonrenewable resources due to heavily discounted cash flows in the outer years of a
reserve’s economic life. This has also become more problematic given the large amount
of undeveloped reserves and probable and possible resource categories that offer visible
production profiles over decades due to the emergence of shale oil production.
For example, in Table 1, the average development cost of proved undeveloped (PUD)
reserves in this dataset is $5.7 billion, which is a significant amount as compared to the
market capitalization of the producing with an average of $9.7 billion. Table 1 shows that
the average Net Price over the sample period is $18.85 per barrel, while the undiscounted
development cost per PUD barrel averages $14.18 ( or $5.46 per barrel on a discounted
basis). The summary statistics demonstrate that PUD costs consist of a sizable portion of
net price. This paper incorporates a more complete cost structure and offers a better
picture of resource rent than net price in isolation. The user costs are captured through the
present value of future development.
This paper illustrates the importance of differentiating reserve quality and
incorporating user cost to quantify a firm’s true resource rent. A fundamental weakness
of HVP is the assumption of homogeneous reserve or asset quality. However, the market
clearly prices assets differently based on quality.
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Again, this concept of resource

differentials (Ricardo, 1821) shows that resource owners with higher productivity earn
rent over owners with less productive land.
6.3 FUTURE RESEARCH
Slade and Thille (2009) propose to rework the theoretical assumptions of
continuous and costless production into the real world where production is lumpy and
managers have flexibility towards extraction and market pricing structure. Additionally,
Slade and Thille (2009) posit the incorporation of real options theory into the Hotelling
framework could be useful. This was first examined by Brennan and Schwartz (1985).
Cairns and Davis (1998) also postulate that in addition to manager flexibility another real
option factor of manager timing is not well explored. Decision rules should define optimal
project investment, commissioning, shut down and abandonment choices. Empirical work
on real options could prove fruitful with undeveloped reserves given the non-linear nature
of decision inputs around breakeven (strike) prices, volatility, interest rates and
commodity prices.
However, the area where this paper’s factor models could be applied next is
directly with Miller & Upton’s (1985a,b).

This provides would provide a solid

comparison between this study and the original HVP research. This paper’s methodology
may also improve the results of the second (Miller & Upton, 1985b) study using
observations from 1981 to 1983. In addition, comparisons could also be made with other
studies that utilized Miller and Upton’s data.
Private transaction valuations could also be another natural extension of the factor
model proposed in this paper. Adelman and Watkins (1995), preferred the purity of
private transactions over market valuations due to the noise of public markets and the
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difficulty of disaggregating other non-oil and gas assets. Watkins (1992) focuses on
property transactions instead of corporate transactions in public markets. This data might
serve as a good cross-check for this paper’s factor methodology. However, one limitation
of prior studies on private transactions is the lack of company specific cost and financial
data, which forced prior studies to use regional cost data as a proxy.
In addition, future research could explore international oil and gas assets.
Hotelling theory is widely used in national income accounting and applied to North
American reserves and producing firms. As a global fungible commodity, exchange rates
and real interest rates should be incorporated in HVP theory.
Akram (2009), illustrates the relationship between general commodity price levels
and the inverse association with real interest rates. Akram explains that oil and metals
prices “increase significantly” in response to reductions in real interest rates. Further, this
research highlights the tendency for commodities to overshoot following the changes in
real interest rates. Akram (2009) also concludes that declining U.S. currency exchange
rates (a weak dollar) leads to higher overall commodity prices.
Sadorsky (2001) further demonstrates the explanatory power of currency
movements and the real cost of money, which heavily influences Canadian oil and gas
stock prices. This exchange rate and real interest rate effect is even more pronounced for
international commodity producers given that their revenues are priced in U.S. Dollars
and costs are priced in their local currency. Sadorsky (2001) fond that an upward move
in the price of oil increases the return to the stock prices of Canadian oil and gas
companies. However, an increase in domestic exchange rates decreases the return to the
stock prices of Canadian oil and gas companies as much or more than the commodity
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price. Thus, this paper illustrates the intertwined effect and importance of currency and
interest rate changes on the economic value of a resource deposit.
Regarding exchange rates, Chen and Chen (2007) find supporting evidence of a
long-run cointegration between exchange rates and oil prices, or more specifically, real
oil prices. In fact, Chen (2007) found significant forecasting power in real oil prices versus
real exchange rates after regressing panel data from G7 countries between 1972 to 2010.
Overall, future research would involve HVP’s net price construct but additional
macro-economic variables for international properties and producing firms would be used.
In fact, in some regions of the world, commodities are deemed hard currency where fiat
money has become debased or unstable. Moreover, global demand for commodities from
emerging market countries should continue to outpace already developed nations over the
years to come.
This research has shown that the Hoteling Valuation Principle does have validity
estimating market values of non-renewable natural resources. However, the original HVP
model is too limiting in its original form to be applied to the practical contingencies of
normal resource extraction. This paper has also shown how resource differentials can
impact valuation by the degree of future development or user cost, which should be
included into the net price framework to fully discover resource rent. This coupled with
allowances for extraction and risk further improve HVP’s ability to explain resource
values.
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TABLES
TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS
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This table presents oil and gas producer statistics from 2015 to 2020. Enterprise In-Ground Value (EIGVT) is calculated as market capitalization (net of nonupstream assets) plus net long-term debt, divided by total proven oil & gas reserves per equivalent barrel. Developed Enterprise In-Ground Value (EIGVD)
includes only proven developed reserves per equivalent barrel. Net Price is defined as the production weighted oil and natural gas equivalent price, less
production cost per equivalent barrel. Crude oil and natural gas prices are linked to spot West Texas Intermediate oil and Henry Hub natural gas prices. Crude
Oil Price is quoted in dollars per barrel and abbreviated as bbl. The Natural Gas Price is quoted in dollars per million Btu or 1 Mcf of pipeline-quality gas,
abbreviated as Mcf. The Realized Oil Equivalent Price equals the production weighted oil equivalent price for each firm. Production Costs include lease
operating expenses and taxes per equivalent barrel produced. Reserve extraction (ER) factor is equal to the annual equivalent production divided by developed
reserves per equivalent barrel. The User Cost factor is defined as the reciprocal of the discounted development cost per proved undeveloped barrel. PUD
Development Cost is the expected proved undeveloped (PUD) development cost per barrel. The Two-Factor Net Price is discounted for the reserve extraction
rate and a 10% risk adjustment factor. The Three-Factor Net Price is discounted for the reserve extraction rate, user cost, and a 20% risk adjustment factor.
Finding & Development (F&D) Cost per barrel is calculated on an organic basis (ex. price revisions, acquisitions, and divestitures) over a three-year average,
per industry standard. F&D winsorized at the 2% level. The SEC PV10 In-Ground Value is equal to the present value of proven reserves discounted at 10%,
plus the market value of net debt divided by proven equivalent reserves per barrel. The Enterprise value to EBITDA ratio over trailing 12-months. The Large
Cap Dummy is defined as, firms with market capitalizations greater than $15B. The Price to Book Ratio is calculated as the common share price divided by
balance sheet equity per share. The Leverage Ratio is calculated as long-term debt divided by long term debt plus balance sheet equity. Market capitalization
is defined as shares outstanding multiplied by the common price per share, in millions of dollars.

(Table 1. Continuted on next page)
TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS
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TABLE 2. VARIABLE CORRELATIONS
This table provides correlation statistics for oil and gas producers from 2015 to 2020. Refer to Table (1) for variable definitions.
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TABLE 3. REGRESSION RESULTS ON NET PRICE: TOTAL VS DEVELOPED RESERVES
This table presents the regression results for total and developed reserve market values between 2015 and 2020. The dependent variable is
Enterprise In-Ground Value (EIGVT,D) of (total or developed) proven oil & gas reserves, net of non-production (upstream) assets. The variable
definitions are included in Table 1. Model (1) regresses the total reserve EIGVT on net price. Model (2) regresses the developed reserve EIGV
on net price. Model (3) regresses the developed reserve EIGVD on net price and controls. Model (4) includes the square of net price term to test
for non-linearity in the relationship between the developed reserve EIGV D and net price. Model (5) runs the first-difference regression of EIGVD
on net price and controls.

55

TABLE 4. REGRESSION RESULTS ON TWO-FACTOR NET PRICE
This table presents regression results for the in-ground market value of developed oil and gas reserves
versus the two-factor net price from 2015 to 2020. The dependent variable is the Enterprise in-ground
value (EIGVD) of proven developed oil & gas reserves, net of non-production (upstream) assets. The
variable definitions are included in Table 1. Model (1) regresses the developed reserve EIGVD on twofactor net price. Model (2) regresses the developed reserve EIGVD on the two-factor net price and
controls. Model (3) includes the square of the two-factor net price term to test for non-linearity in the
relationship between developed reserve EIGVD and net price. Model-(4) runs the first-difference
regression of developed reserves EIGVD on the two-factor net price and controls.
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TABLE 5. REGRESSION RESULTS ON THREE-FACTOR NET PRICE
This table presents regression results for the in-ground market value of total oil and gas reserves versus the
three-factor net price from 2015 to 2020. The dependent variable is the Enterprise In-Ground Value (EIGVT)
of total proven oil & gas reserves, net of non-production (upstream) assets. The variable definitions are
included in Table 1. Model (1) regresses the EIGVT on three-factor net price. Model (2) regresses the EIGVT
on the three-factor net price and controls. Model (3) includes the square of three-factor net price term to test
for non-linearity in the relationship between EIGVT and three-factor net price. Model (4) runs the firstdifference regression of EIGVT on three-factor net price and controls.
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TABLE 6. ROBUSTNESS CHECK
This table presents the regression results of robustness tests. The variable definitions are included in Table 1. Model (1), EIGVT is regressed on the ThreeFactor net price and the per barrel SEC present value of reserves, discounted at 10%, with controls. In Model (2) EIGVT is regressed on the Three-Factor net
price and the enterprise value to EBITDA multiple with controls. In model (3), EIGVT is regressed on the three-factor net price and the Price to book ratio with
controls. In Model (4), the total reserve (EIGVT) variable is regressed on the two-factor net price and finding & developing cost per barrel variables, with
controls. In Model (5), EIGVT is regressed on firms with greater than 66% crude oil vs natural production and controls. In Model (6), EIGVT is regressed on
firms with greater than 66% natural gas vs crude oil production and controls.
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FIGURES
FIGURE 1. COMMODITY PRICE TRENDS

This figure presents the trend of annual commodity prices over the period 2014-2020. The blue bars
represent West Texas Intermediate crude oil price per barrel. The orange line represents Henry Hub
Natural Gas price per Mcf. All prices are as of March 31 of each respective year.
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FIGURE 2. NET PRICE TRENDS
Net price is the difference between the realized oil equivalent price per barrel and the production cost
per equivalent barrel. Commodity prices are as of March 31 st of each respective year. Reserve and
cost data are as of December 31 of the prior year.
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FIGURE 3. TOTAL COST TRENDS
The orange bars represent production costs and include lease operating expenses, transportation costs and
non-income taxes per equivalent barrel. The blue bars represent finding and development costs per equivalent
barrel and are tabulated over a three-year average, per industry standard. All cost data is as of December 31
of each respective year.
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APPENDIX
1.1

Cost Structure
The lifeblood of any oil producer is the efficiency with which it replaces its

production. Bridge and Wood (2010) discuss how the two most important issues for an
upstream producer of hydrocarbons is the profitability balance between production
replacement and the ability to sustain market share within the industry. These indicators
of market competitiveness. Further, in this era of shale oil exploration and development,
high quality resource accumulation is of extreme importance for upstream companies who
wish to remain relevant among other firms, particularly with the emergence of dominant
new resource plays with game changing well economics and very long reserve life drilling
inventories.
Upstream costs for onshore oil and gas exploration and production companies fall
into one of four capital or operating categories; drilling, completion, facilities and
operating. These costs can be capitalized or expensed (operating). Total capital costs to
bring a well into production usually run between $5 and $8 million for the typical shale
oil well (Energy Information Agency, 2016). Though, within the last few year costs have
continued their downward trajectory as completion technology continues to advance.
Fore shale oil, actual drilling costs typically include 30 to 40 percent of total well
costs. These costs are associated with contracting a rig, drilling a well to total depth and
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involve specific costs allocated to day rates to lease the rig and its crew, drill-bits, casing,
cement and drilling fluids and fuel costs.
Completion activities consist of 55 to 70 percent of the total cost to bring a well
online and have increased meaningfully during the era of shale technology1. This is
primary due to the intensity of drilling fluids (water, proppant, and sand) that must be
injected into the wellbore to permit hydraulic fracturing of highly impermeable
sedimentary rock, that ultimately unlocks or releases hydrocarbons from the high-pressure
formation. Shale oil wells are generally drilled horizontally through the shale bedrock,
often as deep as 1,000 feet and another 5,000 feet laterally (Energy Information Agency,
2016). This type of unconventional drilling requires superior technology and skill to
complete effectively and is crucial to the well’s future productivity and economic ultimate
recovery (EUR). However, once the science and technological processes are in place,
exploitation of the unconventional resource play becomes more of a manufacturing
process of infill drilling relative to conventional drilling where the geology is not as well
defined or contained.
There are also some residual facilities construction costs for roads, storage tanks
and water handling and gathering systems infrastructure that typically make up less than
10 percent of the total well outlay.
The process of drilling and completing are capital costs that are captured in a
company’s reported finding and developing costs, which is measured as F&D cost per
barrel of new reserves. Conversely, production costs are expensed as operating costs.
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These variable costs are associated with lease operating expenses, transportation costs and
royalty taxes that are directly attributable to oil and gas extraction.
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